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Abstract 
 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) was written to facilitate and increase certainty in international 
sales transactions.  Unfortunately, a major shortcoming of the CISG is in 
regard to sales of goods that are subject to intellectual or industrial property 
rights.  This article discusses the problems with a uniform substantive law to 
govern sales of goods that are subject to intellectual property rights and 
counsels practitioners to include contract clauses to govern any disputes that 
may arise in relation to a claim brought by a third party asserting ownership 
to the intellectual or industrial property rights of the goods.     
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I.  Introduction 
  
Due to increasing volumes of transnational sales of goods, a uniform substantive law was 
needed to govern disputes.   While in many respects the application of a uniform body of 
contract law has decreased transaction costs and resulted in greater predictability in dispute 
resolution, there is an inherent tension when a transnational body of law governs issues that had 
traditionally been territorially-based.  This tension is particularly evident when considering 
intellectual and industrial property (hereinafter IIP) rights.2  This note will discuss the IIP issues 
that buyers and sellers should consider when entering into contracts for the sale of goods 
governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(hereinafter CISG).3  The ultimate recommendation from this author will be for the parties to 
contract out of the CISG with respect to the law applicable to any dispute concerning a claim 
made by a third party based in IIP.     
The focus of this note will be illuminating problems that can arise for a buyer and seller 
relying on the substantive law of the CISG when the goods sold are encumbered by a legal 
defect.  The note is divided into four sections.  The first part of the analysis in section II will 
address the development and applicability of Article 42 discussing its genesis in uniform contract 
law and the problems in its drafting.  In addition, this section will analyze the procedure under 
Article 43 implementing the protections of Article 42 with additional analysis from comparable 
requirements of Article 39, which deals with non-conforming goods.  Section III will continue to 
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analyze the convergence of a legal defect in the goods with non-conformity, discuss whether 
counterfeit goods can be non-conforming to the contract under Article 35 of the CISG, and 
discuss whether pursuing a remedy through this article instead of, or in addition to, Article 42 
would be advantageous to the buyer.  Section IV concludes with a discussion of sample contract 
clauses and the importance of including certain provisions within each clause.   
II. Article 42: The Genesis, Inclusion, and Failings in Construction   
 
Article 42 
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a third 
party based on industrial property or other intellectual property, of which at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been 
unaware, provided that the right or claim is based on industrial property or other 
intellectual property:  
(a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or otherwise 
used, if it was contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract that the goods would be resold or otherwise used in that State; or  
(b) in any other case, under the law of the State where the buyer has his 
place of business.  
(2) The obligation of the seller under the preceding paragraph does not extend to 
cases where:  
(a) at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could 
not have been unaware of the right or claim; or  
(b) the right or claim results from the seller's compliance with technical 
drawings, designs, formulae or other such specifications furnished by the buyer.4 
A. Should intellectual and industrial property rights have a place in uniform international 
contract law?  
Although the requirement that a seller deliver goods free from third party claims based in 
IIP is common in domestic contract law, that same requirement is nascent in international 
commercial contract law.  The United States, Germany and Spain have specific domestic laws 
concerning warranty and non-conformity of goods, within which are provisions dealing with 
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rights or claims to goods made by a third party based in IIP.  In the United States, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (hereinafter UCC) § 2-312(3) requires that “a seller who is a merchant 
regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the 
rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the like….”5  Similarly, German law 
§ 435 BGB requires that the goods be free from legal defects.6  The Spanish Civil Code Article 
1474 requires that the seller shall indemnify the buyer for the lawful and peaceful possession of 
the good owned.7  Therefore, it is clear that domestic sales law protects a buyer against the 
receipt of goods encumbered by a right or claim asserted in relation to those goods by a third 
party.     
The legal defect provisions of the UCC, German Code and Spanish Civil Code highlight 
the protections that are available for a buyer when domestic law is applied to the transaction.  
The similar language and similar protection of the codes suggests that most States applied a near 
uniform law in protecting against legal defect.  Though there is a certain degree of uniformity in 
protection for the buyer among most domestic law, when that protection is placed into a body of 
uniform international substantive law, the result is significantly different.8  If the CISG had not 
included Article 42, then under the gap filling provision of Article 7(2)9, a domestic court could 
apply its own law to resolve a dispute relating to a third party claim based on IIP rights.  Due to 
the fact that domestic law is rather uniform in protecting the buyer, the result of applying 
domestic law would actually lead to greater predictability and certainty than Article 42 currently 
offers. 
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principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.” 
  
It is instructive to look at the evolution of international sales law, specifically focusing on 
the Uniform Law for International Sales (hereinafter ULIS)10 as the precursor to the CISG.  
Under the ULIS, Article 52 protected the buyer against rights and claims by a third party asserted 
in relation to the goods sold.11  Although it is unclear whether IIP rights were meant to be 
included in Article 52, Professor John Honnold notes that Professor Tunc’s commentary to 
Article 52 was limited specifically to “ownership” and physical title claims.12  Notably absent in 
Professor Tunc’s commentary was legal title defect, which concerns claims to title based in IIP.  
The difference between “ownership defects” and “legal title defects” can be illustrated by the 
example of the sale of a stolen car (ownership defect) as opposed to the sale of a good produced 
by a patented process.  In addition, CISG Article 41 is the current version of ULIS Article 52 and 
includes “only rights and claims which relate to property in the goods themselves by way of 
ownership, security interests in the goods, or the like.”13  Thus, it seems that claims and rights 
based in IIP were not contemplated by the drafters of Article 52.  Certainly it can be said that the 
drafters of the CISG did not recognize that IIP rights or claims had been included in Article 52. 
Despite the failure of Article 52 to cover IIP rights or claims, the ULIS might not be 
completely silent on protection for third party IIP rights or claims.  It is possible for IIP claims to 
fall within Article 33, which is the non-conformity provision of ULIS.  Article 33(1)(d) requires 
that goods possess qualities necessary for ordinary and commercial use.  Professor Honnold 
notes that under the ULIS, conformity of the goods sold was to be determined by the law of the 
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 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Final Act of the Diplomatic 
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 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 2, art. 41, available at 
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place at the time when risk passes.  Therefore, if a patent exists only in State B14 and is in the 
public domain of State S, a seller would be responsible for infringement on the rights of a third 
party patent-owner under an Ex Ship15 contract but not Delivery Duty Paid (DDP).16   Therefore 
the selected Incoterm would change the requirements on each party beyond the traditional risk of 
loss.  Additionally, problems could occur when the parties select an Incoterm that differs from 
the manner in which the contract is actually performed.17  In conjunction with the problem of 
whether the IIP rights were even considered in relation to Article 52, the disconnect that Article 
33 analysis causes seemingly requires considerations of whether IIP rights should be included in 
any uniform international contract law. 
Where domestic law limits the seller’s obligations geographically, a uniform international 
contract law could exponentially increase a seller’s responsibilities.  This fundamental problem 
is perhaps why no steps had previously been taken to include IIP rights or claims.  The 1976 
Working Group deferred discussion of the inclusion of such an article.18   Further, the 
UNIDROIT Principles do not discuss IIP.19  The concern of expanding a seller’s responsibility 
infinitely is highlighted in the Secretariat’s Commentary to the 1978 Draft of then-Article 40 
dealing with IIP claims.  The Secretariat noted that the general rule of warranty against any 
infringement claim by a third party “is appropriate” in domestic transactions.20  The concern 
expressed by the Secretariat’s commentary was that “the seller cannot be expected to have as 
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 UNIDROIT, Rome 1994, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1067 (1995). 
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 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 2, art. 42, (discussing how a seller should be responsible for any infringement 
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complete knowledge of the status of [IIP]….rights which his goods might infringe as he would 
have in his own country.”21  An additional concern was that the buyer could use the goods in a 
resale capacity in other countries at some point in the future, and an article granting protection 
would indefinitely extend the possibility of the seller being required to indemnify the buyer.  Due 
to the disconnect of the ULIS as discussed above, combined with the tension of creating a 
transnational body of law to govern traditionally territorial-based rights, it is clear that the 
drafters of Article 42 faced a unique challenge.   
B. Article 42 requirement of delivery free from any right or claim is not absolute 
Article 42 at its most basic level requires that the seller deliver goods “which are free 
from any right or claim of a third party based on industrial property or other intellectual 
property….”22  The phrase “industrial property or other intellectual property” was adopted at the 
Diplomatic Conference at the suggestion of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(hereinafter WIPO).23  WIPO considers that intellectual property includes all rights “resulting 
from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.”24  Therefore, it 
seems that the industrial and intellectual property rights that would likely be infringed in the sale 
of goods would be limited to copyright, trademark and patents. 
The language “right or claim” in Article 42 guarantees that the buyer will enjoy quiet title 
in possession of the goods.  This specific language is also used in Article 41.25  In the 
Secretariat’s Commentary to that Article, it is noted that the seller has not only breached his 
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 Id. (alteration in original). 
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 CISG, supra note 3, art. 42. 
23
 Allen M. Shinn, Jr., Liabilities Under Article 42 of the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 2 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 115, 122 n.31 (1993) (citing Honnold Treatise, supra note 12) (noting that the term was 
first suggested by Finland and then withdrawn but later reintroduced by Argentina and adopted without discussion). 
24
 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 2, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. 
25
 CISG, supra note 3, art. 41. 
  
obligation if the claim by the third party is valid, but also whenever a claim can be made at all.26  
“The reason for this rule is that once a third party has made a claim in respect of the goods, until 
the claim is resolved the buyer will face the possibility of litigation with and potential liability to 
the third party.”27  Professor Honnold goes on to state that the buyer should be protected in his 
normal expectation that he is “not purchasing a lawsuit.”28   
Although the UCC requires that a claim is “rightful,” that requirement has been 
interpreted to include any claim that survives a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 
challenge.29  While there is no discussion by any commentators to Article 42 about whether a 
buyer can seek indemnification from a seller for a frivolous claim asserted by a third party based 
in IIP, it seems settled in domestic procedural law that the buyer would be entitled to 
indemnification for costs associated with that claim by the party who brought it.30  This 
application of domestic law is consistent with the gap filling function of Article 7 discussed 
previously.  Therefore, private international law points to the applicable procedural rules, and, as 
the rules are generally universal, the application of domestic procedural rules will result in the 
promotion of uniformity in the application of the CISG.31  Although it is true that the buyer will 
only be able to recover costs associated with the claim brought and not with his inability to use 
the goods he purchased until the claim is resolved, it seems entirely consistent with the 
underlying purpose of providing the buyer some relief but not extending potential liability of the 
seller infinitely. 
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 U.C.C. § 2-312 n.2 (2001) (commenting that the cause of action accrues when the breach occurs). 
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 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11; W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is 
the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers? 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361 (1999) 
(comparing and contrasting the loser pays rule in civil law). 
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 CISG, supra note 3, art. 7. 
  
The basic requirement of delivering goods free from third party rights and claims based 
in IIP is restricted by explicit limitations.  As opposed to Article 41 which requires the seller to 
“deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a third party,”32 Article 42 employs the 
limitation that “at the time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have 
been unaware” of the third party rights or claims based in IIP.33  The extent of the required 
“knowledge” is debated.  Professor Honnold suggests that language such as “ought to have 
known” implies a duty to inquire, and because “could not have been unaware” was used by the 
drafters, the standard is closer to actual knowledge.34  Professor Peter Schlechtriem, on the other 
hand, suggests that the seller “must inform himself about the possible industrial or other 
intellectual property rights of third persons.”35   
The famous “mussels case,” decided by the Bundesgerichtshof is instructive as to the 
standard of inquiry required of the seller.36  In that case, the buyer purchased New Zealand 
mussels from a Swiss seller.37  However, the mussels were found to contain a level of cadmium 
that violated German food regulations.38  The buyer wanted to declare a fundamental breach due 
to non-conformity of the goods.39  However, the court held that the laws of the seller’s place of 
business controlled whether the goods were conforming.40  Professor Schlechtriem criticizes this 
decision noting that what is decisive is the particular purpose of the goods; “if the seller knows 
where the goods are intended to be used, then he will usually be expected to have taken the 
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 CISG, supra note 3, art. 41 (emphasis added). 
33
 CISG, supra note 3, art. 42. 
34
 Honnold Treatise, supra note 12, § 270 C. 
35
 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW -THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS 73 (1986), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-42.html. 
36
 CLOUT Case No. 123 [Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995, VIII ZR 159/94 
(F.R.G),], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
  
factors that influence the possibility of their use in that country into consideration.”41  Although 
the case does not require a seller to inquire, Professor Schlechtriem notes that many courts and 
arbitral tribunals require this of the seller.  In light of the seller’s knowledge of the use of the 
goods, when considered in combination with the geographical limitations on the seller’s 
knowledge, it seems to follow that the seller should be required to inquire into the existence of 
third party IIP rights.42  In addition, the Bundesgerichtshof made the distinction that when the 
public laws of the seller’s State and the buyer’s State are the same, Article 35(2)(b),43 which 
deals with seller’s knowledge, would permit the buyer to recover.44  Presumably, registration of 
IIP rights is similar in many States and therefore if the State of use is known to the seller, a duty 
to inquire would not be unreasonable. 
The second limitation on the general requirement of Article 42 is geographical and is split 
into two prongs – where the goods will be used, if contemplated at time of contracting, and 
where the buyer has its place of business.  The geographical limits reflect the concern mentioned 
in the Secretariat’s Commentary of extending required knowledge by a seller of the IIP rights to 
every part of the world.45  One court applying Article 42 echoed the Secretariat’s Commentary, 
stating that the seller guarantees “conformity in certain countries, but not on a worldwide 
level.”46   
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 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF, COMMENTARY ON 
CISG ISSUES CONSIDERED BY THE BGH, presented in "50 Years of the Bundesgerichtshof: A Celebration Anthology 
from the Academic Community," available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html. 
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 See infra p. 13. 
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 CISG, supra note 3, art. 35(2)(b).  “Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform 
with the contract unless they: (b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that 
it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement [sic].” 
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 CLOUT Case No. 123 [Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995, VIII ZR 159/94 
(F.R.G),], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html. 
45
 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 2, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-
42.html. 
46
 Oberster Gerichtstof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 12, 2006, 10 Ob 122/05x (Austria), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060912a3.html. 
  
The first geographical limitation prong is “under the law of the State where the goods 
will be resold or otherwise used, if it was contemplated by the parties….”47  This limitation is 
conditioned on the particular State being “contemplated” by both parties at the time of 
contracting.  Professor Schlechtriem states that, in relation to the term “contemplated,” “the 
seller's obligation in this case depends on where and how the goods are to be used according to 
the contract.”48  However, Professor Schlechtriem does not expand on what is meant by the 
phrase “according to the contract.”   If the contract is governed by the CISG, it is necessary to 
consider the principles of Article 11 and Article 8.  Article 11 states that “[a] contract of sale 
need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as 
to form. It may be proved by any means –  including witnesses.”49  This is a rejection of the 
Statute of Frauds.  Additionally, Article 8 deals with the intent of the parties and allows proof of 
intent to include “all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations” that would 
give a reasonable person notice of the other party’s intent.50  Specifically, Article 8(3) is a 
rejection by the CISG of the Parol Evidence Rule.  Thus it seems, when combined with these two 
provisions, the phrase “according to the contract” should not be limited to the exact language 
used in the contract and should include anything that would give the seller reasonable notice of 
the States in which the buyer would be considering use of the goods.   
                                                 
47
 CISG, supra note 3, art. 42(1)(a). 
48
 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 35 (emphasis original). 
49
 CISG, supra note 3, art. 11.   
50
 CISG, supra note 3, art. 8.   
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be 
interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware 
what that intent was.  
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party 
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the other party would have had in the same circumstances.  
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, 
due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the 
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties. Id. 
  
This might lead to problems of a homeward trend in application of the CISG.  For 
example, if the Article 42 claim is being litigated in the United States, which has a Parol 
Evidence Rule requiring details of the transaction to be reduced to writing, a court might not 
allow evidence of a phone conversation offered by the buyer as proof of an expression to the 
seller of the buyer’s desire to resell the goods in State X when the goods are subject to a third 
party right or claim in State X.  For this specific case in a court in the United States, it would be 
prudent to reduce the contemplated places of use to the contract.   
A further limitation in this clause is the drafters’ choice to use the singular word “State.”  
Throughout the CISG, there are singular and plural forms of “State” used, and from each 
provision it is clear that the drafters meant several States when the plural form is used.51  
Commentary is silent as to the purpose of the singular “State.”  The application of only one State 
is consistent with the drafters’ concern of extending the requisite knowledge of the seller to 
indefinite jurisdictions.52  However, the singular “State” seems to revert back to the default 
territorial-based application of IIP rights.  The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works53 (hereinafter Berne) and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property54 (hereinafter Paris) grant broader transnational protections for parties who possess 
rights or claims based on IIP allowing protection in several States once there is a recognized 
right of protection in one Contracting State.   
Limiting Article 42 to one State could yield the unintended result of permitting the seller 
to choose which State to inquire into for the existence of any IIP rights that may exist in relation 
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 Where the plural form is used: CISG, supra note 3, art. 1 (“parties whose places of business are in different 
States”); CISG, supra note 3, art. 94 (“one or more non-Contracting States”). Where the singular is used:  CISG, 
supra note 3, art. 1(b) (“when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting 
State”); CISG, supra note 3, art. 12 (“a Contracting State which has made a declaration”). 
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 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 2. 
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 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, May 4, 1896, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 
(1988). 
54
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, Mar. 20, 1883, 6 I.L.M. 806 (1967). 
  
to the goods.  A hypothetical would be if the buyer and seller specify in the contract that the 
goods purchased will be used or resold in several States including the buyer’s place of business.  
Although contrary to the dictates of the CISG, a court might ignore the substantive law and 
adjudicate the case with the goal of finding an equitable resolution.  This decision by the court 
could depend on the relationship of the States to the parties and of the States to each other.  
Presumably, if the States stipulated in the contract belong to the same economic union, it would 
not be unreasonable to require the seller to inquire.  Despite this, even if the States are all parties 
to a multilateral convention such as Berne or Paris, each convention allows for different rights 
restricted by first sale, public domain and election of the IIP right holder.  Therefore, because a 
duty to inquire is required of the seller, it seems to follow that a seller could select one of the 
States included in the contract.  This could leave the buyer with the challenge to prove that the 
seller did not inquire into a particular State.  Additionally, the buyer faces the added burden of 
not being indemnified, even though he made known to the seller the location of the desired use.     
The second geographical limitation prong is to rights or claims based in IIP “under the 
law of the State where the buyer has his place of business.”55  This provision is applicable when, 
at the time of the contracting, no States were contemplated by the parties to the contract.  
However, when combined with the limitations imposed on the buyer included in Article 42(2), 
this limitation is essentially without consequence for the seller.  The first limitation on the buyer 
is that he may not rely on Article 42 if “at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer 
knew or could not have been unaware of the right or claim.”56  If there are no States included in 
the contract by the parties, the seller’s default responsibility is to know if any third party rights 
exist in the State where the buyer has its place of business.  However it would be very unusual 
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 CISG, supra note 3, art. 42(1)(b). 
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 CISG, supra note 3, art. 42(2)(a). 
  
for the buyer to assert successfully that he is not aware of the IIP rights of a third party in the 
State in which he operates.  Additionally, if the buyer is intending to use or resell the goods in 
another State, he could be held to a standard where he should have informed himself of the 
existence of any IIP rights or claims dealing with the goods he intends to use.  Therefore, the 
seller’s responsibility is limited significantly when this first restriction is placed on the buyer.   
The few courts who have applied Article 42 have placed a higher threshold of knowledge 
on the buyer (than in relation to the seller) when the buyer has brought an action seeking 
indemnity from the seller.  Two courts in France have held that the Article 42 protections for the 
buyer were inapplicable because the buyer in his “professional capacity” could not have been 
unaware of the infringement.  In a court in Versailles, two French buyers purchased furniture 
from a Spanish seller which included parts that infringed on a third party’s copyright.57  The 
court held that because the buyers had knowledge of the identity of the copyright holder and as 
“professionals in this area” they could not claim that they could not have been unaware of the 
existence of the third party’s rights.58  In an Appellate Court in Colmar, a French clothing 
company purchased shirts from a German company that contained a combination of two types of 
fabric that infringed on a copyright owned by a French textile firm.59  That court held that 
because the buyer in his “professional capacity” could not have been unaware of the IIP rights of 
a third party, he could not rely on Article 42 for indemnification.60  These cases highlight the 
heightened level of knowledge imputed to the buyer.   
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It is instructive to consider whether a change in the underlying facts would have resulted 
in a different outcome in these cases.  First, the courts’ reasoning might change if the IIP rights 
that were being infringed were registered in another country than that of the buyer.   If IIP rights 
exist in State X, a seller who owns the IIP rights to the good he is selling in State S would be in a 
better position than the buyer to know the existence of any rights of a third party in State X.  In 
addition, if the buyer resold or used the goods in State S, the seller should know whether he can 
legally sell his goods to the buyer and if not, a buyer would be entitled to indemnity under 
Article 42.   
Both French courts placed a high level of knowledge on the buyer using the phrase 
“professional capacity” to evaluate whether the buyer should have known that the goods he was 
purchasing would infringe on the IIP rights of a third party.  It is important to query through a 
change in the facts as to what extent “professional capacity” can be extended.  If the third party 
IIP rights existed outside the industry of which the buyer acts in a “professional capacity,” the 
courts’ rationale that the buyer has specific knowledge of his industry is probably less applicable.  
That “professional capacity” language could just as easily be placed on the seller.  However, if 
the buyer is operating on a transnational basis already, a court might expect that he has the 
requisite knowledge and ability to determine the existence of IIP rights in any other State in 
which he intends to operate.  The changing fact patterns is illustrative of how a seemingly 
equitable analysis of which party is in the better position to know of any third party IIP rights or 
claims could be performed by courts.   
  
The buyer’s remedy under Article 42 is also limited to the extent that he supplied the 
seller with the specifications for the goods.61  This limitation acts as a shield to liability for the 
seller.  This shield was recognized by the Israeli Supreme Court when it held that a buyer could 
not recover from a seller when the buyer acquired boots that contained a mark that infringed on 
the trademark rights of a third party.62  In that transaction, the buyer supplied the seller with 
design specifications that contained the mark.63  Despite the express language of Article 42 and 
contrary to the principles of the CISG, 64 the court determined that because both parties knew that 
the boots would infringe upon the well-known mark of the third party, both parties were equally 
responsible for the infringement.65  Although the express language of Article 42 does not permit 
the buyer to recover from the seller when he has supplied the specifications, this decision 
highlights the equitable-style relief that is granted by courts evaluating the knowledge by both 
parties of any violation of third party rights based in IIP. 
C. Article 43 implementation requirements and procedure 
 In order to rely on Article 42, the buyer must follow the requirements of Article 43 in 
giving “notice to the seller specifying the nature of the right or claim of the third party within a 
reasonable time after he has become aware or ought to have become aware of the right or 
claim.”66  There are three distinct issues dealing with specificity of notice, what constitutes 
“reasonable time” and the level of knowledge of the buyer.  Because Article 43 and Article 39 
have similar requirements to pursue a remedy for receipt of goods encumbered by rights of a 
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third party and non-conforming goods, respectively, an analysis of the articles together is 
instructive. 
 The notice given should be sufficiently detailed as to give the seller an opportunity to 
obtain and present evidence on the conditions of the goods.67  In deciding whether the notice 
complied with Article 39 requirements, a German court held that specificity was lacking when a 
buyer sent notice to the seller claiming that the goods “did not conform to our specifications and 
cannot be sold to customers.”68  In commentary to Article 39, it is noted that the purpose of the 
notice is to permit the seller to decide what steps to take next: “by examining the goods himself, 
by repairing the goods, or by delivering substitute goods.”69  Additionally, a seller could have the 
ability to cure the defect70 by negotiating a license with the holder of the IIP rights.   
Although the enumerated performance remedies would be lacking in the case of an 
Article 42 claim, the seller would need to be able to tell the buyer whether the claim is rightful in 
order to avoid cancellation of the contract by the buyer.  If the claim is indeed unsuccessful, the 
buyer could still use the goods as he had originally intended and the seller would be required to 
indemnify the buyer for costs related to the litigation –  as long as it was not frivolous.  Although 
it was mentioned previously that the seller is indemnifying the buyer against rights or claims, it 
seems unlikely that in light of an unsuccessful claim, a buyer would want to return the goods to 
the seller for refund of purchase price.  Additionally, a buyer may be required to mitigate 
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damages by selling the goods that he possesses without any encumbrance.71   Regardless of the 
exact remedy agreed upon by the parties, in order for a seller to reasonably apprise himself of the 
claims of a third party, the notice would need to include: the country in which the IIP right is 
registered, the date of registration, the terms of registration and any licenses granted by the third 
party asserting the right or claim based in IIP.  It might not be enough for the buyer to tell the 
seller that a third party has asserted that it owns the rights to the goods of which the buyer is in 
possession. 
In light of the required degree of specificity in the notice given, the buyer may have to 
wait for the specific claim by the third party to be filed or engage in detailed communication 
with the third party over an extended period of time.  The delay for creating notice with a certain 
degree of specificity might run afoul of the reasonable time requirement of Article 43.    Under 
the Article 39 formulation, German courts have embraced Ingeborg Schwenzer’s “noble month” 
time period for reasonable time.72  Other courts have extended the reasonable time requirement 
based on the circumstances of the particular case.73  In dealing with claims or rights based in IIP, 
it seems a court could reasonably extend the time period for effective notice until the buyer gets 
all the information from the third party.  Due to the fact that the CISG is premised on amicable 
dealings between the buyer and seller, despite not qualifying for effective notice due to a lack of 
specificity, a buyer should notify the seller once he learns of the possibility of a third party right 
or claim.  This will also permit the buyer to accurately make a claim for damages as a result of 
not being able to use or resell the goods once a third party makes the claim it owns the legal 
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rights to the goods.  Therefore, if necessary, the buyer will be able to point to a specific date on 
the calendar for any future damage remedies. 
Where the time for making a claim of non-conformity is limited by the two year 
limitation of Article 39(2), unless inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee, no similar 
outer limit exists under Article 43.  Thus a “seller must take into account that claims based on 
defective legal title may be asserted for the duration of the applicable statute of limitations.”74  
When the seller inquires into the State contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting, he 
should also be mindful of the statute of limitations applicable in that State.  The statute will begin 
to run once the buyer places the goods into the market of the third party’s State, which could 
theoretically be at any point after the buyer has received the goods.   
The knowledge prong of Article 43 is different from and illustrates a disconnect with the 
knowledge requirement within Article 42.  While Article 42 provides “knew or could not have 
been unaware,” Article 43 states “aware or ought to have become aware.”  As discussed in the 
Article 42 knowledge analysis, Professor Honnold suggested that “ought to have known” 
signifies a duty to inquire.75  The duty to inquire is consistent when applied with Article 39 
requiring the buyer to inspect the goods within a reasonable time after receipt.  In that article, the 
duty is placed on the buyer in order to give the seller confidence in the conclusion of the dealing 
with the buyer.  If the defect in the goods cannot be found upon inspection, Article 39 places the 
two year time period on the buyer.  Thus, at some point between the time of actually handing 
over the goods to the buyer and two years from that point, the seller will have been notified of 
any defects.  In relation to a legal defect in the goods, the “ought to have become aware” 
language does not seem to require the buyer to make inquiries into the States in which he plans 
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to use or resell the goods before he commences such use.  The requirement placed on the buyer 
seems to be that any event giving rise to a concern by a layperson as to the status of the goods 
purchased will result in knowledge, and the reasonable time period will begin to run from this 
point.  This results in uncertainty on the part of the seller as to the conclusion of the transaction. 
The interplay of the three requirements could pose a serious problem for the buyer; 
because while he will have to give specific enough notice for it to be effective, he will not be 
able to do so until he has more information.  Yet, if he waits to receive more information, it 
might be an unreasonable delay on his part from the time he ought to have become aware of the 
third party right or claim.  This problem is illuminated in the German automobile case.76  In that 
case, a car dealership in the Netherlands acquired an automobile from a seller in Germany.  After 
acquiring the vehicle and the title documentation, Dutch police seized the car on the suspicion 
that the car had been stolen in France.  The court held that the buyer could not pursue remedy for 
legal defect because he did not give the seller notice of the legal defect within a reasonable time 
after learning of it.  Although the court acknowledged that reasonable time depends on the facts 
of the specific case and the buyer in this case pursued a legal evaluation before contacting the 
seller, the court determined that “for a legal layperson such as [Buyer], the suspicion of theft, 
made obvious by the police seizure, was easily recognized as an especially significant occurrence 
without the need to secure legal advice.”77  The problem in this case is reconciling the amount of 
detail required in the notice with the requirement that it be timely.  As mentioned previously, in 
the case of a right or claim based in IIP, there may be problems with how effective the notice is 
in order to proceed under the Article 42 protections. 
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Despite these requirements on the buyer for specificity and timeliness of notice, a seller 
could not rely on this to defeat a claim by the buyer if the seller had knowledge of the third party 
right or claim based in IIP.78  In relation to this provision, it is illustrative to note that the 
knowledge requirement of the seller is whether he “knew.”  There is no duty to inquire imposed 
by Article 43.  However, when Article 43 is combined with Article 42’s requirements on the 
seller, the seller would have already inquired into the existence of any third party IIP rights.  
There is no comparable knowledge clause in Article 39.  The difference is likely due to the fact 
that physical conformity of the goods can be tested or judged when the goods are transferred to 
the buyer’s possession.  However, an encumbrance due to legal defect in title cannot readily be 
detected by the buyer.  It is only when the buyer receives a cease and desist letter or a lawsuit 
after already selling the goods that he would become aware of any defect.       
Article 42 poses unique questions for the buyer and seller when facing dispute resolution.  
The specific language and the limited court decisions strictly limit the buyer’s abilities to recover 
against a seller.  These limitations combined with the catch-22 notice and reasonable time 
interplay of Article 43 could leave a buyer with goods he is unable to sell, a possibly successful 
infringement claim of a third party and no recourse against a seller. 
III. Counterfeit goods as non-conforming to the contract under Article 35 
 
 Operating within the parameters and express language of Article 42 of the CISG can 
possibly leave the buyer without a remedy against the seller.  Although Article 42 expressly 
deals with rights or claims based in IIP, it might be possible for the buyer to choose to proceed 
under the CISG non-conformity articles for counterfeit goods.  Counterfeit goods are defined as 
imitation goods passed off by the seller as authentic.  The possibility that goods encumbered by a 
third party claim based in IIP was mentioned previously in discussing applicable provisions of 
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the ULIS.79  That discussion noted that under ULIS Article 33, conformity was determined in 
regard to delivery, but Article 35 does not deal with delivery.80  Thus, a discussion of whether a 
buyer can proceed under Article 35 is not foreclosed by the applicability of Article 42. 
CISG Article 35 requires that the seller “deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality 
and description required by the contract….”81  The Article defines conformity as goods that “are 
fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used.”82  
According to the Secretariat’s Commentary, the phrase “ordinarily be used” also “covers a buyer 
who has purchased” for resale as opposed to use.83  Additionally the Secretariat stipulates that 
the goods “must be honestly resalable in the ordinary course of business.”84  Therefore, resale is 
certainly included within the protections of Article 35 under which an infringement claim could 
possibly arise. 
Although goods should be capable of being resold, the level of quality remains at issue.  
Professor Honnold suggests that the purposes clause of Article 35 requires “merchantable 
quality” similar to the UCC.85  UCC § 2-314(2) states that goods are merchantable when they 
“pass without objection in the trade under the contract description” and “are fit for the ordinary 
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purposes for which such goods are used.”86  Professor Jacob Ziegel would make the standard 
much higher.  He states that the test for merchantability is if the buyer knew of the defects he 
would have purchased “the goods without an abatement on the price.”87  If any change in price 
would have resulted, the goods would be deemed to be non-merchantable even if they would be 
fit for a particular end use.88  One commentator has noted in the debate between whether the 
standard is merchantable quality or average quality that “a Canadian proposal that goods should 
be of average quality was withdrawn, since several common law countries did not support it.”89  
Therefore, it seems clear that the threshold is merchantability such that the goods could be resold 
at the price in which the buyer expected to resell them. 
If the buyer received counterfeit goods when he was expecting genuine goods, it seems 
consistent with the previous analysis that the goods would be non-conforming to the contract.  
Although the goods received could ostensibly perform the same function as the authentic goods, 
the buyer would not be able to honestly pass off the goods as authentic.  In addition, the buyer 
would not be able to resell them at the same price he would have been able to as if they were 
authentic.  The conclusion that a buyer could rely on both provisions, Article 35 and Article 42, 
is buttressed by the Secretariat’s Commentary to Article 39 which states that the seller’s two 
obligations: (1) to deliver goods that conform to the contract, and (2) to deliver goods free from 
right or claim of a third party, are independent of each other.90   
                                                 
86
 U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (2001). 
87
 See Jacob S. Ziegel, Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1981), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel35.html. 
88
 Id. 
89
 René Franz Henschel, Interpreting or Supplementing Article 35 of the CISG by using the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, ¶ f (2004), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/henschel.html. 
90
 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 2, art. 39, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-39.html.  
  
The decision for the buyer whether to pursue a remedy under Article 35 or Article 42 will 
turn on the implementing articles, 39 and 43, respectively.  In this decision, it is important for the 
buyer to note the differences in timing available under either article.  While Article 39 requires 
that the buyer inform the seller of non-conformity within two years after the goods have been 
turned over to the buyer by the seller, Article 43 imposes no such limitation.  Thus, a buyer who 
purchases counterfeit goods might not be able to determine that the goods are indeed counterfeit, 
as they appear to be real, within this time period.  In that case, the buyer must rely on Article 
43(2) that the seller knew of the rights of a third party in relation to the goods sold to avoid any 
timeliness issues of notice and the two year limitation.   
In conclusion, although the buyer could proceed under Article 35; for reasons of notice, 
avoidance of a time limit on finding the legal defect and no difference in substantive remedy 
under either article, the buyer should proceed under the requirements of Article 43 in pursuing 
remedy for breach of a seller’s duty to deliver goods free from third party rights or claims based 
in IIP. 
IV. The Practitioners’ Corner: A short guide to dealing with industrial and intellectual 
rights vested in a third party in the transnational sale of goods 
 
With any transnational legal system, problems with implementation must be anticipated 
and the parties must draft accordingly.  CISG Article 42 poses significant uncertainty to buyers 
and sellers of goods predominantly as a result of the minimal level of case law and subsequent 
scholarly commentary.  It is true that the uncertainty could be assuaged if buyers and sellers 
employ Article 42 as the substantive law to govern disputes resulting from the claim of a third 
party based in IIP.  Despite the altruistic objective of creating predictable uniform contract law, 
the risks associated with operating under substantive rules as malleable as Article 42 are 
substantially great and could result in significant financial loss for the parties.  
  
In light of the difficulties expounded on in this note, the applicability of the CISG to any 
rights or claims based in IIP should be eliminated during contract negotiations.  However, a body 
of substantive law must apply to the contract.  As discussed, domestic law has traditionally 
governed defects in legal title.  The parties may choose to apply domestic law to the transaction.  
The question then centers on a conflicts of law analysis in determining which domestic law to 
apply to the transaction with the issue turning most often on place of performance.  Therefore, to 
avoid this further inquiry, the parties should attempt to insert clauses into the contract for 
protection of their interests. 
A sample contract clause to protect the buyer’s interests would be: 
Seller shall indemnify Buyer for any losses as a result of any 
claim of infringement based in intellectual property, as defined 
by the WIPO Convention, made by a third party at any time.  
Seller will refund the purchase price of the contract without a 
requirement of mitigation by the buyer.  In addition to refunding 
the purchase price, Seller will reimburse Buyer the costs related 
to freight and those incurred in any legal proceeding, regardless 
of whether the third party prevails or whether the claim is 
deemed frivolous under the domestic law of the State in which 
the claim is brought. 
 
This clause attempts to grant the buyer as much protection as possible.  Primarily, the 
buyer is concerned with being indemnified for any claim made.  While this is consistent with 
application of the CISG, this clause will allow the buyer to receive compensation for any claim 
made by any third party.  The clause also eliminates the geographical limitation in Article 42.  
This enables the buyer to use the goods in any State and permits him to alter his plans after the 
conclusion of the contract.  The clause also states that the remedy will be damages as opposed to 
specific performance.  In addition any requirement of mitigation is removed – thus eliminating 
any further responsibility of the buyer in relation to the goods.  This clause would be the ideal 
clause from the buyer’s point of view because it removes the uncertainty of the CISG and grants 
  
full protection and places the knowledge requirement on the party who is in the best position to 
know of the existence of any IIP claims or rights related to a product it sells. 
Two sample contract clauses to protect the seller’s interests would be: 
Buyer will provide the Seller with specifications and design 
drawings of the goods desired.  The Seller will not indemnify the 
Buyer for any claims or rights made in relation to the goods 
furnished.  This contract is to be governed by the CISG. 
 
 
Seller will indemnify Buyer for any successful claim based in 
intellectual or industrial property as defined by the WIPO 
Convention made by a third party based on the law of the 
Buyer’s place of business, except when at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the Seller had purchased licenses for 
the goods from the third party or if the third party applied for 
intellectual or industrial property protection through a 
provisional application.   
The Buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the 
goods if he does not give the Seller notice thereof within a period 
of two years from the date on which the goods were actually 
handed over to the buyer.   If the rights are in the public domain 
of the Seller’s State, the Seller will not indemnify the Buyer for 
any claims made by a third party under the law of any other 
State. 
 
The first clause grants the seller the utmost protection.  Under Article 42, the seller is 
shielded from liability if the buyer furnishes the seller with specifications of design.  Although 
the protection of Article 42 seems conclusive as to any dispute for indemnification, the 
discussion of the Israeli Supreme Court case infra illustrates how a seller and buyer could both 
be held responsible for infringing on a third party’s IIP right.  Therefore, the section of the clause 
that denies any indemnity for the buyer will further insulate the seller. 
 The second clause seems like a more likely starting point for the seller in negotiations 
with the buyer because it permits some level of indemnification of any claim made by a third 
party based in IIP.  Firstly, this clause is limited by the term “successful claim.”  It prevents the 
  
seller from being held liable to any claim made by a third party.  Second, the knowledge 
requirement is limited to the buyer’s place of business.  This places the seller and buyer on the 
same footing in ascertaining if IIP rights exist in that State.  The clause also borrows language 
from Article 39 that requires the buyer to give the seller notice within two years of the buyer 
having knowledge of the claim.  This supplants any statute of limitations period that could exist 
in the State.  Therefore, the seller will be able to determine when the transaction has come to a 
close – the statute of limitations for a claim of infringement plus two years.  The seller is also 
shielded if the process or mark has fallen into the public domain in its State.  This limits the 
requirement on inquiring into whether their IIP rights vested in a third party in the buyer’s state 
and thus diminishes the transaction costs.   
 These contract clauses will probably not be agreed to by the other party, but serve to 
highlight the interests of each part – as well as the importance of contracting out of the CISG.  
Due to the interest of predictability and certainty, the parties should avoid leaving any issues 
dealing with IIP rights or claims by a third party to the CISG as the substantive law. 
V. Conclusion 
  
 A buyer and seller engaging in a transnational sales transaction that deals with goods that 
may be encumbered by a third party’s right based in IIP should contract out of the CISG.  The 
CISG does not adequately provide the buyer with a remedy against the seller if a third party 
claim based in IIP is asserted.  The need to eliminate the applicability of the CISG is dictated by 
the inherent tension between the territorial-based IIP rights granted by each State individually 
and the desire for ease in international business.  Although two distinct articles of the CISG – 
Articles 42 and 35 – grant the buyer a remedy against the seller, these articles leave the parties in 
a precarious and uncertain position.  The problems with the plain language of the articles, the 
  
inconsistent interaction with any domestic law applicable and the trend amongst courts in 
reaching equitable relief, make an innocuous and helpful article of substantive law a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing. 
